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RISK OF JURY CONFUSION AS THE
 
GROUND FOR DISCRETIONARY
 
DISMISSALS OF
 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS
 
JOHN D. EGNAL* 
INTRODUCTION 
A damages claim based on federal law will often involve facts 
which give rise to related state law claims.  Since the major expan­
sion of the scope of a civil action occasioned by the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,1 claimants have joined 
their related federal and non-federal2 claims in a single lawsuit. 
Often such joinder results in a question of subject matter jurisdic­
tion over the non-federal claims.  In 1966, the Warren Court articu­
lated a simple, welcoming approach to such jurisdiction in the 
landmark case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.3  In stark contrast, 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts exhibited such hostility to these 
claims that in 1990, Congress settled the basic dispute by codifying 
the Gibbs approach.4  In 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), using the term sup­
plemental jurisdiction, Congress provided for subject matter juris­
diction over all claims that are “part of the same case or 
controversy.”5 
Throughout this period from 1966 to 1990, a number of issues 
roiled in the wake of the Gibbs doctrine,6 which addressed the sub­
* B.A., Lehigh University; J.D., Temple University; LL.M., Temple University. I 
would like to thank my colleagues Bruce Miller and Art Wolf for their invaluable 
assistance. 
1. FED. R. CIV. P.; Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 
1938 and its Discontents, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 283 (2008). 
2. Non-federal, as used in this article, refers to a claim which, standing alone, does 
not satisfy any ground of federal subject matter jurisdiction.  Normally, such claims 
would be based on state law between citizens who are not diverse under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a), or who are diverse as to claims for less than the jurisdictional amount. 
3. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (finding that 
“state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”). 
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Proce­
dural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. 
85 
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86 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
ject matter jurisdictional power of the federal trial courts over non-
federal, or as they were then known, pendent claims.  One such 
problem was whether the trial judge should entertain the claim—a 
question of the court’s discretion. Judge-made law addressed this 
question, identifying various grounds that would justify dismissal 
(even if the court had the power to entertain the claim).7  For exam­
ple, dismissal of the state law claim was appropriate when the fed­
eral claim—the basis for federal jurisdiction—had been dismissed 
or was simply the tail on a state law dog, or when considerations of 
comity called for unsettled state law issues to be resolved by the 
state courts.8  The 1990 statute in § 1367(c) expressly codified these 
three grounds for discretionary dismissal.9 
One judge-made ground for discretionary dismissal was not ex­
pressly codified—dismissal of a state law claim based solely on the 
ground that trial of both the state and federal claims in one lawsuit 
might lead to jury confusion.10  This article will address the un­
resolved question of the appropriateness of the use of this ground 
to dismiss a state law claim properly joined to a related federal 
claim. 
I. GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 
Since Congress created the lower federal courts in 1789,11 there 
has been a problem defining the scope of the federal judicial power 
in lawsuits involving the joinder of both federal and non-federal 
claims.  While it is axiomatic that only Congress can define the 
scope of that power (within the bounds established by Article III of 
the Constitution), prior to 1990, Congress had, with few exceptions, 
left this problem to the federal courts.12 
L. REV. 1399 (1983); Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and 
Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE L. J. 627 (1978); Michael Shakman, The New Pendent 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968) (all providing varying 
interpretations of the Gibbs standard). 
7. See Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1967). 
8. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 official commentary at 765-66 (West 2006); Patel v. 
Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 1996) (state law claim predominated); Fable v. 
Braslow, 913 F.Supp. 145, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d 111 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (fed­
eral claims dismissed); Saturday Evening Post. Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 
1191, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.Supp. 1215, 1221 
(S.D.N.Y 1978); see also infra note 19. 
9. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (text of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006)). 
10. See id. 
11. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. 
12. The most pertinent to this article is 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (2006), which pro­
vides for subject matter jurisdiction over “a claim of unfair competition when joined 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 87 
Using the labels “pendent” and “ancillary,” the federal courts 
developed two overlapping judge-made doctrines to address the 
problem.  The 1966 Supreme Court decision of United Mine Work­
ers v. Gibbs became the leading case.13 Gibbs reflected a welcom­
ing approach to the problem of jurisdictional power.14 
In Gibbs, a federal claim (labor law) was joined with a state 
law claim (interference with contract).15  The Court first held that 
the district court had power (i.e. pendent subject matter jurisdic­
tion) over the state law (non-federal) claim because the two claims, 
with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection 
or trademark laws.”  The House Report stated: 
Subsection (b) is added and is intended to avoid “piecemeal” litigation to en­
force common-law and statutory copyright, patent, and trade-mark rights by 
specifically permitting such enforcement in a single civil action in the district 
court.  While this is the rule under Federal decisions, this section would enact 
it as statutory authority.  The problem is discussed at length in Hurn v. Oursler 
(1933, 53 S. Ct. 586, 289 U.S. 238, 77 L.Ed. 1148) and in Musher Foundation v. 
Alba Trading Co. (C.C.A. 1942, 127 F.2d 9) (majority and dissenting 
opinions). 
Historical and Revision Notes, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006). 
In 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006), Congress provided that: 
[N]otwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a 
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have orig­
inal but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 
[Bankruptcy Code] or arising in or related to cases under title 11. 
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).  And in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2006), Congress provided that fed­
eral courts may “abstain[ ] from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or 
arising in or related to a case under title 11.”  Such language has been interpreted to 
recognize the power of federal courts to hear supplemental claims. See Patrick M. Bir­
ney & Michael R. Enright, May a Bankruptcy Court Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Predicated on its Referred “Related To” Jurisdiction?, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 1, 3 (2010). 
In 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006), Congress authorized the removal of “a separate and 
independent claim” when joined with a removable federal question claim.  In the early 
days, fewer lawsuits raised the problem; the 1938 Federal Rules and post-WWII federal 
legislation increased dramatically the lawsuits containing the joinder of federal and 
non-federal claims. 
13. The portion of Gibbs relevant to this discussion is Part I. Gibbs was written 
by Justice Brennan, Part I (which addressed the subject matter jurisdiction issue) was 
joined by all of the Justices who participated; Chief Justice Warren did not participate. 
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 715 (1966). See D.C. Common 
Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that Gibbs is the 
leading case); Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1211 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that Gibbs 
is the leading case). 
14. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724-25 (overturning the “unnecessarily grudging” approach 
of Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933)). For a detailed description of the early 
developments leading up to Gibbs, see Arthur D. Wolf, Codification of Supplemental 
Jurisdiction: Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1992). 
15. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 717-18.  Since there was no diversity of citizenship, this was 
a non-federal claim. 
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88 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
together, “comprise[d] but one constitutional ‘case.’”16  In later 
cases, the Supreme Court differentiated between Gibbs (involving 
a pendent claim), and cases where the state law claim was asserted 
against one not subject to the federal claim (pendent party).17  The 
1990 statute eliminated this distinction, making it clear in the final 
sentence of § 1367(a) that newly named supplemental jurisdiction 
was available in such a situation.18 
But another problem remained. The Gibbs opinion, in dicta, 
elaborated on the “consistently . . . recognized” notion that the trial 
court had the discretion to dismiss the state law, or pendent 
claims,19 and held that the trial court had not abused that discretion 
by retaining jurisdiction after the federal claim had been dismissed 
on the merits.20  As with its holding regarding jurisdictional power, 
Gibbs’s discussion of discretion reflected a welcoming approach to 
federal jurisdiction. 
Gibbs mentioned grounds that would be appropriate to justify 
a discretionary dismissal.21  One was “the likelihood of jury confu­
sion” if both the federal and state claims were tried to a single 
jury.22  Other possible grounds that might justify a discretionary dis­
missal were also mentioned, but Justice Brennan stressed the idea 
that pendent jurisdiction’s “justification lies in the considerations of 
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.”23  The 
presence of these factors supported retention of the pendent claim, 
while their absence should incline a trial judge to dismiss. 
16. Id. at 725. 
17. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976). 
18. The text of § 1367(a) is: 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided other­
wise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction 
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
19. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Gibbs cited Mass. Universalist Convention v. Hil­
dreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 1949) (upholding the dismissal, without 
prejudice, of a pendent state law claim in the wake of a dismissal, on the merits, of the 
federal question claim). 
20. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 728. 
21. Id. at 726-27. 
22. Id. at 727, 723, 725 n.13 (reflecting the welcoming approach to pendent juris­
diction, the Court offered ideas on retaining the entire case, such as the use of a special 
verdict, and stressed the importance of “‘try[ing] his . . . whole case at one time’”) 
(quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 320 (1927)). 
23. Id. at 726. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 89 
The Court returned to the issue of discretion to dismiss a pen­
dent claim in 1970 in Rosado v. Wyman,24 where, like Gibbs, it up­
held a trial judge’s decision to retain jurisdiction over a pendent 
claim.25  In Rosado, where the federal claim became moot, the 
Court reiterated the theme that retention of pendent claims should 
be the norm: 
We are not willing to defeat the commonsense policy of pendent 
jurisdiction—the conservation of judicial energy and the avoid­
ance of multiplicity of litigation—by a conceptual approach that 
would require jurisdiction over the primary claim at all stages as 
a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim.26 
Rosado reiterated the broad, welcoming theme of Gibbs.27 
The next opinion, three years later, reflected the shift brought on by 
the Burger Court’s28 much less welcoming approach to federal 
plaintiffs in general and to civil rights plaintiffs in particular.29  The 
case, Moor v. County of Alameda,30 involved a pendent party 
24. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). 
25. Id. at 401. 
26. Id. at 405. 
27. Id. at 404-08. Rosado was decided during the transition from the Warren 
Court (which ended in 1969 with the appointment of Chief Justice Burger) to the con­
servative Burger court, which was completed in 1971 with the appointments of Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist. JOHN DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
THE  NIXON  APPOINTMENT THAT  REDEFINED THE  SUPREME  COURT 265 (2002) (“The 
Rehnquist choice, however, has redefined the Supreme Court, making it a politically 
conservative bastion within our governmental system.”).  While technically the Burger 
Court, Rosado was a 7-2 decision, written by Justice Harlan. Rosado, 397 U.S. at 399. 
The dissent, written by Justice Black, was joined by Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 430-35. 
28. See generally DEAN, supra note 27 (describing the shift resulting from Presi­
dent Nixon’s four appointments between 1969 and 1971). 
29. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1962). With the language 
that follows, the Court redefined the qualified immunity defense to permit civil rights 
defendants to successfully move for summary judgment: 
Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we conclude 
today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government 
officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discov­
ery.  We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary 
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 
Id. at 817-18; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights 
Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 537 (2003) (“Legal Services Corporation v. Velaz­
quez . . . is aberrational because a civil rights plaintiff won, which has rarely happened 
in recent years in the Rehnquist Court.  A year ago, in October Term 2000, the Court 
ruled against civil rights claims in virtually every case in which they were presented.”). 
30. Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 713-18 (1973). 
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90 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
claim31 that was dismissed on two grounds. The trial judge in Moor 
dismissed pendent state law claims against the county, even though 
the related federal claims against individual defendants (county em­
ployees) were still pending.32  The trial judge pointed to: (1) the 
novel and complex state law issues raised by the pendent claims and 
(2) likelihood of jury confusion if the state and federal claims were 
tried to the same jury.33  Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court upheld this dismissal.34  Whether Moor’s language as to jury 
confusion was holding or dicta, federal trial judges had little doubt 
after Moor that they could dismiss a pendent state law claim on the 
ground there was a likelihood of jury confusion.35 
Three grounds other than jury confusion were mentioned in 
Gibbs as justification for discretionary dismissal: (1) the non-fed­
eral claim raises novel or complex issues of state law;36 (2) the non-
federal claim substantially predominates the lawsuit;37 and (3) the 
federal claim has been dismissed before trial.38  These three 
grounds for discretionary dismissal were adopted by Congress as 
§ 1367(c)(1), (c)(2) and (c)(3).39  In each of these situations, it is 
easy to see the justice in sending those claims to the state courts for 
31. Unlike Gibbs, where the pendent claim was added against the union, a party 
already subject to federal jurisdiction, the pendent party claim in Moor was asserted 
against the county, which was not subject to federal jurisdiction. Compare United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), with Moor, 411 U.S. at 710-17 (Part 
II). 
32. Moor, 411 U.S. at 697. 
33. Id.at 715-16. 
34. Id. at 697, 717. 
35. See Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 125-26 (2006) (describing “the virtually 
unfettered discretion” available to trial judges). 
36. Gibbs, 383 US at 726 (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided 
both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for 
them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”). 
37. Id. at 726-27 (“Similarly, if it appears that the state issues substantially 
predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the 
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without 
prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals.”). 
38. Id. at 726 (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even 
though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as 
well.”). 
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (“The district courts may decline to exercise sup­
plemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if–(1) the claim raises a novel 
or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or 
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”).  In addition, Congress 
provided in (c)(4) authority to dismiss a supplemental claim “in exceptional circum­
stances, [when] there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 91 
resolution.  This is easiest to see for the second and third grounds. 
In cases involving the third ground, state law claims are the only 
ones left in the lawsuit; in the case of the second ground, the lawsuit 
is predominantly based on state law. Thus, for these two grounds, 
there is no problem of a lawsuit divided between state and federal 
court.  For the first ground (novel or complex state law) a discre­
tionary dismissal of the state law claims does create the burdens of 
a divided lawsuit, a risk which Gibbs suggested should be balanced 
against the need for the “surer-footed” reading of state law.40 
Unlike the three grounds discussed in the previous paragraph, 
risk of jury confusion does not serve any obvious federal or national 
interest.  Yet it can be easily invoked by a judge who wants to disfa­
vor the civil rights plaintiff or favor the defense.41  Despite the tech­
niques available to minimize the risk of confusion42 and the small 
likelihood that a civil lawsuit will actually be tried,43 there was no 
doubt that the pre-1990 case law permitted a trial judge to dismiss a 
pendent claim simply by stating there was a risk of jury confusion if 
the case were tried to a single jury.44  Many judges had made it a 
40. An alternative to dismissal of a claim involving unsettled state law is certifica­
tion of question(s) of law by the federal court to the highest court of the state. See 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997) (“Certification proce­
dure, in contrast, allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the 
question directly to the State’s highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and 
increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.”); 17A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE­
DURE § 4248 (3d ed. 2011); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a 
Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (2003). The Wolf-Egnal proposal 
contained such a provision.  Subsection (f) provided “[t]he district court, in determining 
the nature and scope of any non-federal claim based on state law, shall freely utilize any 
certification procedures available for the determination of state law.” Federal Courts 
Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 
5381 and H.R. 3898 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary 31, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]. See infra notes 102-109 (discussing the Wolf-Egnal 
proposal). 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). 
42. In Gibbs, Justice Brennan praised the trial judge for using a special verdict 
form to aid the jury’s resolution of multiple claims. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729; see also 
Matthew A. Reiber, The Complexity of Complexity: an Empirical Study of Juror Com­
petence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929 (2010) (discussing methods for improving 
the ability of juries to deal with complex cases); Development in the Law, The Jury’s 
Capacity to Decide Complex Civil Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1997) (same). 
43. See Government Survey Shows 97 Percent Of Civil Cases Settled, PHOENIX 
BUSINESS  JOURNAL (May 30, 2004), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2004/ 
05/31/newscolumn5.html; see also infra note 275. 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 68-74. 
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92 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
routine practice to dismiss such claims45 and as long as they stated a 
reason, they were rarely found to have abused their discretion.46 
As noted above, the new statute contained, in subsection (c), a 
provision authorizing the use of discretionary dismissal.  If the sup­
plemental claims were dismissed and the federal claims were still 
pending in federal court, the plaintiff would be faced with four 
choices—none good: (1) the costly and difficult option of appellate 
review.47  If appellate review failed or was not attempted, the re­
maining choices are (2) file a state court lawsuit raising the state law 
claims and pursue lawsuits in both state and federal court,48 (3) file 
a state court lawsuit raising the state law claims and abandon the 
federal claims,49 or (4) stay in federal court and abandon the state 
law claims. 
Such was the law in 1990, when in the wake of confusion sowed 
in 1989 by the 5-4 decision of Finley v. United States,50 Congress 
responded promptly51 and adopted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, using the term 
45. See infra notes 68-76. 
46. If the trial judge gave risk of jury confusion as the reason, reversal was un­
likely; cf. Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1073 (2d Cir. 1989) (giving no reason for 
refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion). 
47. The appeal could fail on the merits (trial judge did not abuse her discretion) 
or the appeal could be dismissed as not a final order. See David D. Siegel, Practice 
Commentary, Operation of “Supplemental” Jurisdiction Under § 1367, 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1367 (West 1993) (“Appealability of Discretionary Dismissal[:] It would have been 
helpful if Congress had included some instruction about whether a dismissal under 
§ 1367(c) is appealable.  Congress having said nothing about it, however, the matter 
must be left to the usual batch of appellate statutes and rules, notably 28 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1291 and 1292 and Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Under 
§ 1291, the rule is that the disposition must be ‘final’ in order to be appealable.  If all 
claims are dismissed, giving rise to a final disposition of the whole case, finality would 
be satisfied and appeal allowed.  When only the dependent claim is dismissed, however, 
the matter is more complex.  Prior cases involving dismissals of claims that depended on 
pendent or ancillary jurisdiction can be consulted.”). 
48. In addition to the obvious duplication in pretrial proceedings and the greater 
difficulty in achieving settlement when cases are pending in both state and federal 
court, preclusion problems are likely to arise as soon as one of the two lawsuits becomes 
final. See Edward H. Cooper, An Alternative and Discretionary § 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 153, 
158-59 (1998); 18 CHARLES  ALAN  WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §4412 (2011). 
49. If the federal claims are joined in the state court lawsuit, the defendant can 
remove the entire case to federal court. 
50. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); see also discussion infra notes 88­
94. 
51. Justice Scalia seemed to solicit a Congressional response with the following: 
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular 
statute can of course be changed by Congress.  What is of paramount impor­
tance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear inter­
pretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 93 
supplemental52 to replace both pendent and ancillary. The key pro­
visions of the statute were sections (a), (b) and (c). 
Section 1367(a) essentially codified the “power” paragraph of 
Gibbs, using “the same case or controversy under Article III . . . .”53 
Congress added a sentence at the end of § 1367(a) to make it pellu­
cidly clear that the “one case” test applied both where there was 
one plaintiff and one defendant, like Gibbs, as well as “claims that 
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”54  Section 
(b) imposed limitations on the use of supplemental jurisdiction in 
certain cases where there were no federal question claims and fed­
eral jurisdiction was available “solely on” the basis of diversity of 
citizenship.55  Subsections (c)(1)-(3) set forth three specific grounds, 
all based on language from Gibbs, on which a trial judge could base 
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. 
52. The term “supplemental” seems to have been coined by Professor Richard A. 
Matasar in Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and the Rejec­
tion of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (1983). 
In footnote 3, Matasar states that: 
[f]or convenience, this Article uses “supplemental jurisdiction” throughout to 
refer to all exercises of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The term is apt, for 
it suggests an extension of power over claims normally outside federal jurisdic­
tion in order to serve important federal interests that supplement the purposes 
underlying the decision on the original federal claims. See, e.g., United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (allowing convenient and efficient liti­
gation of an entire legal dispute); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 
(1861) (ensuring a forum for vindication of claims); Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (preserving a federal court’s abil­
ity to function effectively). 
Id. at 1402 n.3; see also William D. Claster, Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdic­
tion: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1271-87 (1975); 
Richard D. Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 34, 34 (stating that “‘[s]upplemental jurisdiction’ is a generic term encom­
passing the concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction”). 
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006); see supra note 18.  With respect to this subsection, 
both the text and the House Report are consistent. 
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  Thus Congress clearly overturned both Aldinger and 
Finley. 
55. Id. § 1367(b).  Subsection (b) contained obvious drafting flaws which led to a 
serious split in the circuits over its application to class actions and to simple joinder by 
the plaintiff of another plaintiff who did not meet the amount in controversy require­
ment or was not diverse from the defendant.  In 2005, the Supreme Court, in Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005), ended the dispute, hold­
ing that § 1367(b) did not preclude supplemental plaintiffs who did not satisfy the 
amount requirement, but did preclude supplemental plaintiffs who did not satisfy the 
diversity requirement.  For the extensive literature (from 1990 to 2004) on this issue, see 
Richard D. Freer, The Cauldron Boils: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Amount in Contro­
versy, and Diversity of Citizenship Class Actions, 53 EMORY L.J. 55, 57 n.15 (2004) (“I 
will not even try to list a representative sample [of the law review articles concerning 
§ 1367(b)] except to note a colloquium in the Emory Law Journal in 1992, 41 EMORY 
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94 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
a discretionary dismissal, as well as a “catch all” provision in 
(c)(4).56  The full text of § 1367(c) is as follows: 
[Authority of Courts to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction:] The 
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a claim under subsection (a) if-(1) the claim raises a novel or 
complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predomi­
nates over the claim or claims over which the district court has 
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims 
over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional cir­
cumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 
jurisdiction.57 
It is clear that the likelihood of jury confusion is not part of 
§ 1367(c)(1)-(3).  The topic that this article will address is whether 
this ground for discretionary dismissal has survived and is part of 
§ 1367(c)(4), or whether it has been eliminated by the 1990 statute. 
In Part II of this Article, the pre-1990 history relevant to the 
topic will be expanded beyond the brief discussion in this introduc­
tion.  Part III will examine the legislative history of § 1367(c)(4), 
followed in Part IV by the reaction of the district courts (IV.A), 
courts of appeal (IV.B), and scholars (IV.C).  Part V will reflect the 
author’s own analysis of the availability of the risk of jury confusion 
as the basis for a § 1367(c)(4) dismissal. 
II. PRE-1990 HISTORY: JURY CONFUSION IS ON THE
 
JUDGE-MADE LIST
 
As one might expect, the reported decisions after Gibbs and 
before the adoption of § 1367 (1966 to 1990) involving a proposed 
discretionary dismissal of a pendent58 claim based solely on the 
ground of a likelihood of jury confusion reflect a mixed picture— 
some were dismissed and some were retained.59  Judges who re­
tained jurisdiction tended to focus on the reasoning from the 1966 
and 1970 decisions of the Supreme Court (Gibbs and Rosado), 
L.J. 1, and a symposium in 1998, published at 74 IND. L.J. 1, which featured four articles 
and nine responses.”). 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006). 
57. Id. 
58. In this Part II, the term “pendent” will be used; “supplemental” was not used 
in this context by the courts until the adoption of § 1367 in 1990. 
59. See Carrol v. General Datacomm Industries, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 71, 73 
(D.Conn. 1987) (retaining pendent claim); Esposito v. Buonome, 647 F.Supp. 580, 581 
(D.Conn. 1986) (dismissing pendent claim); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 
555 F.Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1983) (dismissing pendent claim). 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 95 
which upheld jurisdiction over pendent claims, even after the fed­
eral claims had dropped from the cases.60  Thus these decisions fo­
cused on overall efficiency and fairness to litigants. 
For example, in Miller v. Lovett,61 the Second Circuit reversed 
a pretrial dismissal of a pendent claim. The federal § 1983 claim for 
excessive force was tried to a jury and resulted in a defendants’ ver­
dict.62  On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the verdict on the 
federal claim due to errors in the instructions and remanded for a 
new trial.  It then addressed the pretrial dismissal of the pendent 
claim. 
Miller asserted a constitutional claim of excessive force and com­
mon-law claims for negligence and assault and battery.  If these 
federal and state claims are so tightly interwoven that a decision 
on the former will collaterally estop litigation of latter, we see no 
principled reason for refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction 
over the entire case, and potential injustice in failing to do so. 
The reasons given by the district court for dismissing the 
state claims are unpersuasive.  In its one-page endorsement rul­
ing, the court stated that “courts in this district have repeatedly 
discouraged pendent claims in section 1983 litigation”, and that 
Miller “d[id] not adequately address the concerns raised in Espo­
sito  [v. Buonome, 647 F.Supp. 580 (D.Conn.1986)].”  It is obvi­
ous, first, that dismissing Miller’s pendent claims on the ground 
that they are “discouraged” in § 1983 cases is tantamount to giv­
ing no reason at all for their dismissal.  No decision of the Su­
preme Court or of this circuit implies that pendent jurisdiction is 
disfavored in civil rights actions; indeed our viewpoint is to the 
contrary.  See Perez  [v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793,] 798 [2d Cir. 1988]. 
Even if it ever had validity, Esposito, on which the district 
court relied, is now outdated. . . .  Any remaining danger of jury 
confusion under the new standard can in most cases readily be 
met with judicious use of special verdicts and carefully drawn in­
structions. See Carroll v. General Datacomm Industries, Inc., 680 
F.Supp. 71, 73 (D.Conn.1987) (Burns, J.).63 
60. See, e.g., Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1989). 
61. Id. at 1073. 
62. Id. at 1068-69.  Apparently, plaintiff chose to abandon the state law claim; no 
further proceedings are reported. Id. 
63. Id. at 1073. Miller specifically explained why Esposito was outdated. 
[In Esposito], common-law tort claims were dropped from a § 1983 action pri­
marily because the common-law standard for liability (reasonableness) con­
flicted with what was assumed to be the federal standard (the “shock the 
conscience” test of Johnson v. Glick ) [sic] and therefore were thought to cre­
ate a likelihood of jury confusion.  647 F.Supp. at 581.  As we discuss more 
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96 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
There are few reported opinions by trial judges denying an un­
appealable64 motion to dismiss a pendent claim.  One example is 
West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, where the town sued under al­
leging causes of action against activists who protested at a women’s 
clinic including: violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO), violations of Connecticut statutory law, 
common law nuisance, conspiracy, and negligence.65  In granting a 
preliminary injunction the court held that injunctive relief was not 
available under civil provisions of RICO, but that for purposes of 
obtaining a preliminary injunction under state nuisance law, the 
town established the likelihood of success on the merits.66  As to 
the court’s jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims, the court 
cited Miller v. Lovett for the proposition that “a presumption favors 
exercising [pendent] jurisdiction.”67 
Far more common during this period are reported decisions 
dismissing pendent claims on the ground of jury confusion.  Some, 
for example the lower court in Miller v. Lovett,68 explain why there 
would be a likelihood of jury confusion if the federal and pendent 
claims were tried together.  Many, however, simply invoke a broad 
(not case specific) presumption against the assertion of pendent 
jurisdiction.69 
A classic example is Douglas v. Town of Hartford,70 where a 
mother and her son filed excessive force § 1983 claims against Hart­
ford and several of its police officers. The son was in utero when his 
mother was assaulted.71  Chief Judge Clarie refused to dismiss the 
son’s federal claims against the police officers72 but did dismiss the 
extensively above, however, the “shock the conscience” standard no longer 
applies to cases such as this, and the proper test is now one of “reasonable­
ness” under the [F]ourth [A]mendment. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1865. 
Id. 
64. Such decisions are not “final” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus not appeala­
ble. See supra note 47. 
65. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 371, 371 (D.Conn. 
1989). 
66. Id. at 378, 381. 
67. Id. at 376. 
68. Miller, 879 F.2d at 1073.  The lower court opinion is not reported; it is quoted 
in part by the Second Circuit. 
69. Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F.Supp. 1267, 1269 (D.Conn. 1982). 
70. Id. at 1269. 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  The court did hold that the plaintiff could not sue “John Doe” defendants; 
rather, plaintiff had to identify and serve each defendant it wanted to sue. Id. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 97 
Monell (federal) claims against Hartford.73  Judge Clarie then 
turned to the defendants’ motion to dismiss the pendent (state law) 
claims against both the police officers and the municipality. What 
follows is his entire discussion of the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
these pendent claims: 
In the Third Count of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege a myr­
iad of state law claims sounding in tort, including assault and bat­
tery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and 
gross negligence. This Court has regularly stated that it will not 
exercise pendent jurisdiction over state tort claims in civil rights 
actions commenced under § 1983, because these federal lawsuits 
would be unnecessarily complicated and burdened by the intro­
duction of many state law issues into an already complex litigation. 
See Galbert v. City of Hartford, Civ. No. H-80-576, Ruling on 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (May 28, 1982); Saylor v. Town 
of Hartford, Civ. No. 8-81-542, Ruling on Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss (December 31, 1981).  Accordingly, the Court dismisses 
Count III of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleges violations of 
the state tort law.74 
Writ large, there is no doubt that prior to 1990 the likelihood 
of jury confusion was a proper ground on which to base the pretrial 
dismissal of a pendent claim.  As we have seen, the lower courts 
differed as to the need for a case-specific analysis. They also dif­
fered as to the slope of the playing field: was it level, or was there a 
presumption in favor or against the assertion of pendent jurisdic­
tion?  While the United States Supreme Court never addressed 
these questions, it is clear that the favorable view of pendent juris­
diction exhibited by the Warren Court75 was replaced with a nega­
tive—one might say very “grudging”—view by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts.76 
Despite the different approaches to discretionary dismissals of 
pendent claims, from the Gibbs-Rosado-Miller approach that fa­
73. Id. at 1271.  The claims were dismissed based on the soon-to-be-discredited 
heightened pleading standard; see Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence 
and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that a court may not require a 
heightened pleading standard in a § 1983 municipal liability case). 
74. Id. at 1271 (emphasis added); see also Esposito v. Buonome, 647 F.Supp. 580, 
580-81 (D.Conn. 1986) (disapproved by the Second Circuit in Miller v. Lovett, supra 
notes 62-64); Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347, 349 (D. Haw. 1973). 
75. The Warren Court presided over the cases from Gibbs (1966) to Rosado 
(1970) (see supra text accompanying notes 13-28). 
76. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts presided over the cases from Moor (1973) 
to Finley (1989) (see supra text accompanying notes 28-35); for reference to grudging, 
see supra note 14. 
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98 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
vored retention, to the Moor-Douglas approach that favored dis­
missal, the impetus for legislative action had nothing to do with 
discretionary dismissals.  Rather, as mentioned in the Introduction, 
it was the 1989 5-4 decision of Finley v. United States, concerning 
jurisdiction power, that led directly to the adoption in 1990 of 
§ 1367.77 
III. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE PATH OF § 1367(C)(4): JURY
 
CONFUSION IS  NOT ON THE LIST
 
This section will focus on the text and legislative path of 
§ 1367(c)(4).  The best place to begin the story of the adoption of 
§ 1367 is with one of the vexing questions left open after Gibbs: 
whether its rationale would apply to claims against so-called pen­
dent parties.78  Outside the Ninth Circuit,79 most courts of appeals 
resolved that question in the affirmative.80  The Supreme Court 
never fully addressed it.  In Moor v. County of Alameda,81 the 
Court explicitly left the question open, resting its decision on what 
it viewed as appropriate use below of a discretionary dismissal.  In 
Aldinger v. Howard,82 the Court again rejected the pendent party 
claim, but with a more diffused rationale. Then Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for a six-judge majority, acknowledged that the logic of 
Gibbs was relevant to the question of jurisdictional power, but ad­
ded an additional test—the so-called congressional negative.83  Re­
lying on the soon to be discredited reasoning from Part III of 
Monroe v. Pape,84 Aldinger held that jurisdictional power over the 
77. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989). 
78. See supra note 31. 
79. See Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977) (categorically re­
jecting pendent party jurisdiction). 
80. See Pendent Jurisdiction of Federal Court over State Claim Against Party not 
Otherwise Subject to Federal Jurisdiction where State Claim is Sought to be Joined with 
Claim Arising Under Laws, Treaties, or Constitution of United States (“Pendent Party” 
Jurisdiction), 72 A.L.R. FED. 191, 220-25 (1985) (listing the First, Second, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth and Tenth Circuits as permitting pendent party jurisdiction and the Fourth, Sev­
enth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as precluding such jurisdiction). 
81. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 712-15 (1973). 
82. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). 
83. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 415-19 (1976). The congressional 
negative was also used to deny jurisdiction in Owen v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374-77 
(1978) (no power over claim by plaintiff against non-diverse third-party defendant). 
84. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-18 (1976). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 
which in Parts I and II opened the flood gates for § 1983 litigation against individuals 
(over the strong dissent of Justice Frankfurter who predicted the flood), holding that 
the City of Chicago was not a “person” under § 1983 because the Congress of 1871 
refused to add an unrelated provision, concerning municipal liability for the acts of 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 99 
pendent party claim was negated by congressional hostility to 
claims against municipalities.  This point was described as a “legal 
difference” between Aldinger and Gibbs.85  In addition, the Court 
added a second point which it called a “factual” difference: “ If the 
new party sought to be joined is not otherwise subject to federal 
jurisdiction, there is a more serious obstacle to the exercise of pen­
dent jurisdiction than if parties already before the court are re­
quired to litigate a state-law claim.”86 
Rather than categorically precluding pendent party claims 
(which would have followed from the “factual” point) Justice Rehn­
quist articulated a clear limit to the reach of the Court’s decision: 
There are, of course, many variations in the language which Con­
gress has employed to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts, 
and we decide here only the issue of so-called “pendent party” 
jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought under §§ 1343 (3) and 
1983.  Other statutory grants and other alignments of parties and 
claims might call for a different result.  When the grant of juris­
diction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the pros­
ecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience can 
be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal 
court may all of the claims be tried together.87 
In 1989, the case Justice Rehnquist anticipated in the para­
graph quoted above reached the Court: Finley v. United States.88 
An airplane crash led to a claim against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and state law claims against other 
defendants.  Now the Chief Justices, both Rehnquist and Justice 
White89 must have changed their view since they were two of the 
four Justices who joined Justice Scalia’s five-judge majority opinion, 
which threw this dictum from Aldinger under the bus.90  Like Ald­
those they could not control (e.g., KKK), to the Act that included § 1983. The issue was 
clarified in Part I of Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 
658, 664-89 (1978), which held in Part I that municipalities are “persons” under § 1983, 
but in Part II rejecting respondeat superior liability and imposing a requirement that 
liability be based upon a “custom” or “policy.” 
85. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15-18. 
86. Id. at 18. 
87. Id. 
88. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
89. Along with Rehnquist, White was the only Justice on the Finley bench who 
joined the Aldinger majority opinion. 
90. The other two who joined the majority were Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
(not on the Court in 1976); Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in both 
Aldinger and Finley; Justice Stevens was in the majority in Aldinger but dissented in 
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100 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
inger, Finley relied on the same double barrel approach: (1) adding 
a new party is frowned upon and (2) the FTCA suggested that Con­
gress was hostile to the pendent claim.91  The pellucid efficiency 
point from Aldinger was thus subordinated to a fanciful notion of 
Congressional hostility toward combining federal claims against the 
government and state claims against other defendants in a single 
civil action, although all claims arose from a single accident.92 
More importantly, Finley raised serious doubts about the via­
bility of pendent jurisdiction, writ large.93  At the same time, recog­
nizing that he had seriously roiled the waters, Justice Scalia 
challenged Congress to assert what he viewed as its exclusive role in 
determining the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction: 
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by 
a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What 
is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate 
against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may 
know the effect of the language it adopts.94 
It did not take Congress long to respond. The Federal Court 
Study Committee (FCSC) had already been established by Con­
gress (November 1988, effective date of January 1, 1989) and given 
Finley, relying heavily on the language from Aldinger quoted in the text. Finley, 490 
U.S. at 567-68. 
91. Finley, 490 U.S. at 544-56. 
92. The majority made this point with the following language: 
Because the FTCA permits the Government to be sued only in federal court, 
our holding that parties to related claims cannot necessarily be sued there 
means that the efficiency and convenience of a consolidated action will some­
times have to be forgone in favor of separate actions in state and federal 
courts.  We acknowledged this potential consideration in Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 
18, but now conclude that the present statute permits no other result. 
Id. at 555-56. 
93. See H.R. Rep., No. 101-734, at 6874 (1990).  “Recently, however, in Finley v. 
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), the Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on the 
authority of the federal courts to hear some claims within supplemental jurisdiction.” 
Id.; see also Wolf, supra note 14, at 13 (“Indeed, in Finley, the Court appeared to cast 
doubt on the Gibbs case itself, suggesting that congressional authorization is necessary, 
at least where new parties are joined, before the courts may invoke supplemental 
jurisdiction.”). 
Clearly Justice Scalia wanted to “impair” Gibbs, if not overrule it.  But it would 
appear that he did not have the votes. Thus, when he said “[t]he Gibbs line of cases 
was a departure from prior practice, and a departure that we have no intent to limit or 
impair” it would seem he was speaking for the majority, not himself. Finley, 490 U.S. at 
556 (emphasis added). 
94. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. 
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a broad charge.95 Finley added a measure of urgency to the topic 
(as it was then known) of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.96 
Chaired by Third Circuit Judge Joseph Weis, the FCSC Final Re­
port, dated April 2, 1990, contained, among other recommenda­
tions, one that “Congress should expressly authorize federal courts 
to assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an independent 
federal jurisdictional base.”97  This report did not contain a specific 
proposal, although the non-authoritative working papers did go 
further.98 
The primary focus of the FCSC was on jurisdictional power, 
and was reflected in § 1367(a)99 and in § 1367(b) which limited sub­
section (a) power in certain diversity cases.100  The FCSC report 
contained the following brief reference to discretionary dismissals: 
In order to minimize friction between state and federal courts, 
however, Congress should direct federal courts to dismiss state 
claims if these claims predominate or if they present novel or 
95. Pub. L. 100-702, Title I, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4644.  Section 102(b) of the 
Act described the purposes of the FCSC as follows: “The purposes of the Committee 
are to—(1) examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United 
States; [and] (2) develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary . . . .” 
Id. 
96. Finley, 490 U.S. at 545-54. 
97. Federal Court Study Committee, Report of The Fed. Courts Study Comm., 
47-48 (April 2, 1990) [Hereinafter “FCSC Report”]. 
98. In the FCSC working papers, dated July 1, 1990, there is a more detailed 
discussion of supplemental jurisdiction as well as a proposed statute; the working pa­
pers were expressly not adopted by the FCSC, and in the introduction to the March 12, 
1990 Report of the Sub-committee on the Federal Courts and their Relation to the 
States, contained in the working papers, the following note appears: “Not every mem­
ber of the subcommittee has agreed to all of the proposals or analysis contained in this 
[March 12, 1990] Report, and the absence of dissent should not be understood to signify 
approval.”  Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Subcommittee on the 
Role of the Federal Courts and their Relation to the States (Mar. 12, 1990). But see 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 569-70 (2005) (where the 
Court failed to note this point as it equates conflicting views on § 1367(b) from the 
House Report and the working papers). 
99. The Congressional goal of § 1367(a) was to restore the “power” paragraph 
from Gibbs and apply it to both new claims and new parties; that is, to overturn Ald­
inger and Finley.  The text of subsection (a) and the House Report discussion of that 
subsection are consistent, and no court has had any trouble with the provision.  United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
100. The Congressional goal was to codify Owen v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), 
as homage to the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 
(1806). 
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102 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
complex questions of state law, or if dismissal is warranted in the 
particular case by considerations of fairness or economy.101 
The original version of what was to become § 1367 began with 
a proposal submitted on June 8, 1990 directly to the chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee102 by Professors Arthur Wolf and John 
Egnal.103  In this version, subsection (c) restricted discretionary 
power to dismiss supplemental claims to three situations: (1) the 
federal claim was dismissed104 (2) the supplemental claim substan­
tially predominates105 or (3) the federal and supplemental claims 
should be tried separately.106  In addition, this version required fed­
eral judges to “file . . . a written statement of reasons for the dismis­
sal”107 and contained no catch-all provision. 
This original version, § 120 of House Bill 5381,108 was substan­
tially replaced by a version promoted by Judge Weis, which was 
based on the proposed statute in the FCSC working papers.109  In 
the Weis proposal, subsection (c) included the first two grounds for 
discretionary dismissal from the original with one change–the elimi­
nation of the word “substantially” from what was to become 
§ 1367(c)(2).110  In addition, this version added two grounds: “the 
101. FCSC Report, supra note 97, at 47-48.  Note the unusual use of “fairness or 
economy” as a reason for dismissal. See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text 
(standing the terms on their heads as a means of excluding claims from federal jurisdic­
tion rather than including them). 
102. Hearings, supra note 40, at 686 (containing letter to the chair of the Commit­
tee, Robert W. Kastenmeier). 
103. Id. at 27-31 (describing the Wolf-Egnal Proposal). 
104. Adopted as § 1367(c)(3). 
105. Adopted as § 1367(c)(2). 
106. Not adopted. 
107. Hearings, supra note 40 at 30, 688. 
108. H.R. 5381, 101st Cong. (1990). 
109. Wolf, supra note 14, at 16-20 (1992) (providing a detailed description of 
these events).  Actually there were two similar proposals—one from Judge Weis, Hear­
ings, supra note 40 at 98, and the other from Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler, 
Hearings supra note 40 at 722.  As to subsection (c) they are the same, down to the typo 
in the first line.  This version of § 1367(c) will be referred to as the Weis proposal: 
(c) The districts [sic] courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex 
issue of State law, (2) the claim under subsection (a) predominates over the 
claim or claims for which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the 
district court has dismissed all claims for which it has original jurisdiction, or 
(4) there are other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, conve­
nience, and fairness to the litigants, for declining jurisdiction. 
Id. 
110. Hearings, supra note 40 at 30, 98. Compare Hearings, supra note 40 at 98 
(the Weis proposal, which omitted the word “substantially”), with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(2) (2006) (retaining the word “substantially”). 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 103 
[supplemental] claim raise[d] a novel or complex issue of state 
law”111 and a broad catch-all provision with the following, puzzling 
language: “(4) there are other appropriate reasons, such as judicial 
economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants, for declining 
jurisdiction.”112  The language is puzzling because the reasons set 
forth in this version of (c)(4) are not reasons to dismiss; rather, they 
are reasons to retain a supplemental claim.113  According to Gibbs, 
the “justification [for pendent jurisdiction] lies in considerations of 
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants”;114 it was 
the absence of these reasons that would suggest that discretionary 
dismissal might be appropriate.  It may be that Judge Weis was 
thinking about economy and convenience for the federal trial 
judges and not so much about Gibbs’s obvious concern with overall 
judicial economy and “convenience and fairness to litigants.”115 
The House subcommittee116 made two changes to the Weis 
version: first, “substantially” was restored to § 1367(c)(2)117 and 
second, Weis’s (c)(4) catch-all was totally rewritten to read: “(4) in 
exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 
declining jurisdiction.”118  No official document explains these 
changes.119  Clearly, the Congressional drafters wanted to limit, not 
expand, the use of discretionary dismissals. This was the version 
111. Adopted as 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2006). 
112. Hearings, supra note 40 at 30, 98. 
113. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (emphasis added); sometimes defendants want a single lawsuit as much 
as plaintiffs; more often defendants want to frustrate plaintiffs. 
116. Drafting was done by Committee staff; no members involved. See Wolf, 
supra note 14, at 17. 
117. Although this was a minor change, it was clearly aimed at adding to the 
constraints on the use of discretionary dismissals. Supra note 110. 
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006). 
119. For a further discussion of this legislative change, see Wolf, supra note 14 at 
25.  “Although the hearings do not reflect it, other consultants to the subcommittee 
criticized the Weis substitute after the hearing on September 6th. [n.145: ‘Conversation 
with Charles G. Geyh.’]  They thought the discretion given to judges under the substi­
tute to dismiss the non-federal claims was too broad.” Wolf, supra note 14, at 25. That 
is, the Weis version gave too much discretion to trial judges, which would undermine 
the basic goal of § 1367(a).  Note that the FCSC working papers approach to discretion 
is at odds with the action taken by the Congressional drafters. Following the recom­
mendation to expressly authorize supplemental jurisdiction, the working papers add: 
“In addition, we recommend that Congress direct the courts to decline to exercise juris­
diction more often then they do at present.” FEDERAL  COURTS  STUDY  COMMITTEE, 
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMM. REP. Volume I, 559 (July 1, 1990).  Professor Freer’s 
view of the replacement of Judge Weis’s version of (c)(4) is that “for some reason, it 
was removed before the final draft was approved.” RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCE­
DURE 220 (2d ed. Aspen 2009). 
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104 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
that was adopted by Congress and signed into law by President 
George H. W. Bush.120 
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental juris­
diction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a 
novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially 
predominates over the claim or claims over which the district 
court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed 
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in excep­
tional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for de­
clining jurisdiction.121 
The phrase “jury confusion,” which was clearly part of the pre­
1990 case law, was never explicitly included in any version of the 
text.122  The Weis catch-all, “there are other appropriate reasons, 
such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants, 
for declining jurisdiction” would easily include jury confusion as a 
permissible ground for dismissal.123  However, the clause which au­
thorized dismissal for any “appropriate reason” was rejected by the 
drafters and replaced with language that imposed significant textual 
limitations.124 
Rather than resolve the status of “jury confusion,” the House 
Report125 ignored the point.  Its entire coverage of subsection (c) is 
the following puzzling paragraph: 
Subsection [1367](c) codifies the factors that the Supreme Court 
has recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a dis­
trict court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim, 
even though it is empowered to hear the claim.  Subsection 
(c)(1)-(3) codifies the factors recognized as relevant under cur­
rent law.  Subsection (c)(4) acknowledges that occasionally there 
may exist other compelling reasons for a district court to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction, which the subsection does not fore­
close a court from considering in exceptional circumstances.  As 
under current law, subsection (c) requires the district court, in 
exercising its discretion, to undertake a case-specific analysis.126 
120. Wolf, supra note 14, at 2. 
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4). 
122. Id. 
123. Wolf, supra note 14, at 24-25. 
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 
125. There was no Senate report for this statute. 
126. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-734, at 29 (1990). 
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If one only considered the first sentence and viewed it as au­
thoritative (while ignoring the rest of the paragraph and the text of 
subsection (c)), there would be no doubt that risk of jury confusion 
would be an appropriate ground for discretionary dismissal.  How­
ever, the second sentence of this paragraph undermines such a con­
clusion.  The so-called codification of prior case law is said to be 
reflected in § 1367(1)-(3).127  Clearly, none of these three subsec­
tions has anything to do with jury confusion.128  As such, if “jury 
confusion” survived the statute, it could only be in (c)(4).  But 
(c)(4) dismissals are limited to “exceptional circumstances,” and 
jury confusion could hardly be characterized as “exceptional.”129 
One way to correct this obvious conflict and bring the text and 
House Report into alignment would be to read the words “some 
of” into the first sentence, so the House Report would read, “codi­
fies some of the factors.”  Such an interpretation would underscore 
the omission from the statute of jury confusion as a ground for dis­
cretionary dismissal.  Or one could ignore the text and the second 
sentence of the House Report and simply follow pre-1990 case law. 
As we will see, the federal courts have done both. 
IV. JURY CONFUSION UNDER § 1367(C)(4) 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the case law under 
§ 1367(c)(4), there are two indisputable points that should be men­
tioned: first, a discretionary dismissal of a claim within the court’s 
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) must be based upon 
§ 1367(c), and second, the risk of jury confusion is not any part of 
(c)(1), (2) or (3).130  Explicit articulation of the need to use 
§ 1367(c) for discretionary dismissals appears in Executive Software 
North America, Inc. v. United States District Court: 
[I]t is clear that Congress intended section 1367(c) to provide the 
exclusive means by which supplemental jurisdiction can be de­
clined by a court.  Not only is this conclusion supported by the 
legislative history . . . , but a contrary reading of the statute would 
appear to render section 1367(c) superfluous.131 
127. Id. 
128. The closest is subsection (1), which is about judge (not jury) confusion.  28 
U.S.C. § 1367(1). 
129. See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text. 
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(3) (2006). 
131. Executive Software North America, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. 
Dist. of Calif., 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (reversing the dis­
missal of a supplemental claim where the trial court gave no reason for the dismissal); 
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106 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
The self-evident fact that jury confusion is not within 
§ 1367(c)(1), (2) or (3) was mentioned supra, at the end of Part III. 
What is less evident, and worth repeating132 is the policies shared 
by the three judge-made grounds Congress did adopt, as distin­
guished from jury confusion, the ground Congress did not adopt. 
Any supplemental claim dismissed under (c)(1), (2) or (3) can read­
ily be said to belong in state court.133  The same cannot be said 
about a claim that might lead to jury confusion if included in a trial 
with a related federal claim. 
A.	 Post-1990 Judicial Decisions: the District Courts Divide on 
Jury Confusion134 
Focusing on the outcomes of decided cases, the overall picture 
of motions to dismiss supplemental claims135 based on the likeli­
hood of jury confusion did not change with the adoption of 
§ 1367—some were granted and some were denied.  Most, but not 
all136 courts recognized that the statute did change the name from 
“pendent” to “supplemental.”  As far as the impact of the statute, 
there was a wide divergence. 
Prior to 1990, a court faced with such a motion to dismiss a 
supplemental claim would have to assess the reasons for the likeli­
hood of confusion and the availability of means to reduce or elimi­
nate that confusion, and then place this analysis on the scale of 
discretion.137  Since the adoption of the statute, some, but not all, 
courts recognize that a new threshold issue has emerged: whether 
see also Feezor v. Tesstab Operations Grp., Inc., 524 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 
2007) (“Once the court acquires supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, section 
1367(c) provides the only valid basis upon which it may decline to exercise it.”). 
132.	 See supra notes 35-46. 
133. Because it is the only claim left in the lawsuit, it is the predominant claim, or 
it is a claim that should be settled by a state, not a federal judge. 
134. The discussion starts with district court decisions, since no appellate court 
has dealt directly with the issue. 
135. In this part, the term “supplemental” will be used, even for pre-1990 cases; 
“supplemental” and “pendent” are synonymous. 
136. See Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 1995) (in 
lawsuit filed in 1993, “pendent” used at least six times and “supplemental” once in 
reporting the outcome of another post-1990 decided case). 
137. This assumes the court took the motion seriously; as we have seen, some 
courts reflexively dismiss all supplemental claims. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Detroit, 
No. 10-13179, 2010 WL 4259835, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (exercising the court’s discre­
tion to dismiss the supplemental claims). 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 58 S
ide A
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 58 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE103.txt unknown Seq: 23  9-MAY-12 10:37
2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 107 
jury confusion is an appropriate ground on which to base a discre­
tionary dismissal.138 
Many opinions have ignored this question, and assumed that 
the statute made no change in the appropriate grounds.139  These 
opinions mostly result in dismissal of the supplemental claim, while 
some deny the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the risk of jury 
confusion is not great or can be ameliorated.140  Some opinions ac­
knowledge the threshold issue.141  Of that group, a few make an 
attempt to support the view that jury confusion is an appropriate 
ground on which to base dismissal,142 while most opinions that fo­
cus on this threshold issue conclude that the risk of jury confusion 
as an appropriate ground for dismissal has been eliminated by the 
statute.143 
1. Risk of Jury Confusion as a Ground for Dismissal 
An oft-cited example of a post-1990 decision dismissing (and 
remanding to state court) supplemental claims solely on the ground 
of potential jury confusion is Padilla v. City of Saginaw.144  This 
excessive force civil rights action, asserting both federal and state 
claims, was filed in state court and properly removed to federal 
court.145  Plaintiff then moved to remand the entire case.146  After 
rejecting the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), the court, appar­
ently on its own motion,147 retained jurisdiction over the federal 
138. See, e.g., Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F.Supp. 1309, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 
1994) (“The potential for jury confusion can be a sufficiently compelling reason for 
declining jurisdiction.”). 
139. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1562 n.3 
(11th Cir. 1994) (“Formerly known as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, such grounds 
for the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction have now been codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 1367.”). 
140. See, e.g., Rosen v. Change, 758 F.Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1991) (noting that 
“concerns [regarding jury confusion] . . . are outweighed by the furtherance of judicial 
economy in trying these closely related claims together, particularly when clear jury 
instructions may alleviate any juror confusion”). 
141. Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315; LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare 
Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413, 1414-15 (D. Colo. 1993); 13D CHARLES  ALAN  WRIGHT, AR­
THUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL  PRACTICE AND  PROCEDURE, 
§ 3567.1 n.46 (3d ed. 2008). 
142. See, e.g., Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315. 
143. LaSorella, 818 F.Supp. at 1415. 
144. Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1309. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. According to the docket entries, the defendants never moved to dismiss the 
supplemental claims; rather, the only motion before Judge Cleland was the plaintiff’s 
motion to remand the entire case to state court. Id. 
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108 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
claims while it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the closely related state law claims, relying on § 1367(c)(4).148  The 
opinion contains one paragraph in support the assertion that the 
risk of jury confusion was an appropriate ground for dismissal.149 
That paragraph includes a reference to the Supreme Court’s 1973 
decision of Moor v. Alameda and a sentence from the Wright, 
Miller & Cooper treatise,150 which relied, for its statement, on the 
1966 Gibbs decision.  The opinion then contains four paragraphs 
supporting the assertion that the risk of jury confusion is great (i.e. 
compelling) while ignoring the question whether this compelling 
risk is exceptional.151  Finally, the court notes “that the advantages 
to be gained by trying these claims together are outweighed by the 
potential for confusion of the issues by the jury.152  Thus, remand of 
all state law claims is appropriate.”153 
Judge Cleland has continued to dismiss supplemental claims on 
the ground of jury confusion, often sua sponte.154  His more recent 
opinions include a paragraph, noticeably absent from Padilla, ad­
dressing the (c)(4) requirement that the situation be exceptional.155 
148. Id. at 1314-17. 
149. Id. 
150.	 Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315 (1994). 
The potential for jury confusion can be a sufficiently compelling reason 
for declining jurisdiction.  The United States Supreme Court has cited jury 
confusion in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law as a proper 
reason for a district court to decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Moor v. 
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 . . . (1973).  Wright, Miller & Cooper identify 
jury confusion as a sound reason for a district court to remand state law claims 
over which it has supplemental jurisdiction.  “One example of this [exceptional 
circumstance under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4)] might be the possibility of jury 
confusion, which was recognized in Gibbs as a reason for declining jurisdic­
tion.”  Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3567.1, n. 46. 
Id. 
151. Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315-16. 
152. Id. at 1316-17. 
153. Id. at 1317.  The following sentence preceded the one quoted in the text: 
“There will be some duplication of effort required by the prosecution and defense of 
this case in two courts if the plaintiff decides to pursue her federal claims.” Id. at 1316. 
“Plaintiff’s counsel intimated at oral argument that Plaintiff might prefer to abandon 
her federal claims rather than pursue them in federal court.” Id. at n.5. 
154. See Barnes v. Hayse, No. 10-12501, 2010 WL 3448377 (E.D.Mich. 2010); 
King v. City of Detroit, No. 10-12133, 2010 WL 2813349 (E.D.Mich. 2010); Orr v. City 
of Roseville, No. 10-11389, 2010 WL 2595533 (E.D.Mich. 2010).  Other decisions to the 
same effect include Riza v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-12605, 2009 WL 3756685 
(E.D.Mich. 2009) (relying on Padilla), Walker v. City of Detroit, No. 10-13179, 2010 WL 
4259835 (E.D.Mich. 2010), and Young v. Bank of Boston Conn., No. 3:93 CV 1642 
(AVC), 1996 WL 756504 (D.Conn. 1996). 
155. Walker, 2010 WL 4259835 at *3. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 109 
However, what is said to be exceptional is simply the standard pre-
Gibbs rationale for dismissal based on the risk of jury confusion: 
The court finds that exceptional circumstances are present in this 
case in weighing the likelihood of jury confusion, judicial ineffi­
ciency, substantial inconvenience to the parties, and potential un­
fairness in outcome which could readily result by attempting to 
resolve all claims in a single trial.156 
Another rationale that often accompanies the dismissal of sup­
plemental claims comes from the first sentence of the relevant para­
graph of the House Report157—the simplistic idea that § 1367(c) 
was a codification of Gibbs and its progeny. Thus in German v. 
Eslinger,158 an excessive force civil rights claim, the sua sponte dis­
missal of the supplemental claims was based on the view that § 1367 
was simply a codification of Gibbs,159 supported by cases which re­
lied only on pre-1990 decisions.160 
Some courts, while denying a motion to dismiss a supplemental 
claim, nevertheless tacitly acknowledge that risk of jury confusion is 
an appropriate ground on which to base a dismissal.161  Such deci­
sions conclude that in the case at bar, the risk of confusion is not 
great or that the policies that favor retention of the supplemental 
162 aclaim outweigh the risk of confusion. Thus in Rosen v. Chang,
prisoner wrongful death claim, the court held that under federal law 
the defendants could be held liable in their individual capacities, 
and that it would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 
state law claims, despite the risk of jury confusion.  “Such concerns 
[about jury confusion], however, are outweighed by the furtherance 
of judicial economy in trying these closely related claims together, 
particularly when clear jury instructions may alleviate any juror 
confusion.”163 
156. Id. at *6. 
157. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, supra note 126, at 29. 
158. German v. Eslinger, No. 6:08-CV-845-ORL-22GJK, 2008 WL 2915071 
(M.D.Fla. 2008). 
159. The court did not differentiate between Gibbs’ relevance to § 1367(a) and 
§ 1367(c). Id. 
160. See Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1562 n.3 (11th 
Cir. 1994); James v. Sun Glass Hut of Cal., Inc., 799 F.Supp. 1083, 1084 (D.Colo. 1992); 
see also Zelaya v. J.M. Macias, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 778, 783 (E.D.N.C.1998) (FLSA class 
action; state and federal claims would result in distinct classes; one paragraph to dismiss 
supplemental claims based on jury confusion; no discussion). 
161. Rosen v. Chang, 758 F.Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1991). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 803; see also McLaurin v. Prestage Foods, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 465 
(E.D.N.C. 2010) (certifying class and upholding supplemental jurisdiction over state 
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2.	 Risk of Jury Confusion Rejected as a Ground for 
Dismissal 
Some district courts have explicitly rejected the view that 
under the 1990 statute, the risk of jury confusion is still a proper 
ground for discretionary dismissal. For example, in LaSorella v. 
Penrose St. Francis Healthcare System, an age discrimination civil 
rights case, the plaintiff joined both federal and state law claims 
against the defendant, who promptly moved to dismiss the state law 
claims under both § 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4).164  The court quickly re­
jected the (c)(2) argument that the state law claim predominated 
and then turned to the contention that if jurisdiction were retained, 
there would be a risk of jury confusion.165 
LaSorella rejected several opinions which it suggested sup­
ported the notion that § 1367(c) was a total codification of Gibbs 
and its progeny.166 
Most [courts] have uncritically suggested that the [Judicial Im­
provement Act]167 is merely a codification of the old pendant 
jurisdiction doctrine, thus allowing them to continue to rely on 
Gibbs.  See, e.g., Walter Fuller Aircraft v. Republic of Philippines, 
965 F.2d 1375, 1389 n. 13 (5th Cir.1992); Promisel v. First Ameri­
can Artif. Flowers, 943 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir.1991); Sinclair v. 
Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir.1991).  Some sections of 
the JIA’s legislative history suggest such an interpretation. See 
H.Rep. No. 101-734, 101st Cong.2d Sess., 27-29, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6873-75.168 
claims, subordinating claimed jury confusion to broader efficiency concerns in an FLSA 
case); Lucarino v. Con-Dive, LLC, No. H-09-2548, 2010 WL 2196233 (S.D.Tex. May 27, 
2010) (retaining supplemental jurisdiction; upholding prior decision); Lucarino v. Con-
Dive, LLC, No. H-09-2548, 2010 WL 786546, at *3-4 (S.D.Tex. March 5, 2010) (consid­
ering and rejecting jury confusion); Heinemann v. Howe & Rusling, 260 F.Supp.2d 592 
(W.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying on Miller v. Lovett). 
164. LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413 (D. Colo. 
1993). 
165. Id. at 1414. 
166. Id. at 1415. 
167. The Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), 
contained eight titles; pertinent to this article is Title III, Implementation of Federal 
Courts Study Committee Recommendations, also known as the Federal Courts Study 
Committee Implementation Act of 1990.  This Act contained a number of so-called 
non-controversial matters that had been proposed by the Federal Courts Study Com­
mittee, including Supplemental Jurisdiction, which when adopted was codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1367. 
168. LaSorella, 818 F.Supp. at 1415. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 111 
These cases cited by LaSorella concerned subsection (a), which 
can be fairly characterized as a simple codification of the Gibbs 
doctrine.169  Thus, Judge Kane cited to the wrong cases as standing 
for the point that as to discretionary dismissals, Gibbs was codi­
fied.170  As to the specific statement in the House Report concern­
ing subsection (c) that it “codifies the factors that the Supreme 
Court has recognized,”171 Judge Kane correctly stated, “[t]his pas­
sage is simply wrong and I reject it in favor of the plain meaning 
and language of [§ 1367(c)].”172  One additional reference from the 
Wright, Miller & Cooper treatise is worth noting: “The circum­
stances in which a court may exercise discretion to refuse to hear a 
case are quite strictly defined.”173 
Other district courts have followed the lead of LaSorella.174 
For example, in Gard v. Teletronics Pacing Systems, Inc.,  a civil 
rights case involving claims of age discrimination and sexual harass­
ment, the court refused to consider the risk of jury confusion in 
connection with the defendant’s motion to dismiss the supplemental 
claims.175 
B.	 Post-1990 Judicial Decisions: The Appellate Courts Have Not 
Dealt Directly with the Issue 
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
the issue at hand.  Of the six cases where the Court mentioned 
§ 1367(c), only one contained any discussion of the operation of 
that subsection.  In City of Chicago v. International College of Sur­
geons,176 the Court reinstated the trial court’s decision that it had 
169.	 Id. 
170.	 Those cases are discussed in the previous paragraphs. 
171. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, supra note 126, at 29 (setting forth the language of 
the House Report). 
172. LaSorella, 818 F.Supp. at 1416.  The opinion continued with the following 
footnote: “Professor Oakley suggests that the late night legislative action that accompa­
nied the passage of [§ 1367] may be responsible for some of the oddities of the present 
statute.” Id. at 1416 n.1 (citing John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of 
Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 
U.C.DAVIS L.REV. 735, 736 n.2 (1991)).  Professor Oakley had more to say on this 
point, which will be discussed infra in Part IV.C (scholarship). 
173. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3567.3 at 39 (2d ed. Supp 1992).  Recall, prior 
footnote 150, that Padilla also relied on the Wright, Miller & Cooper treatise, albeit a 
different section.  This discrepancy will be addressed in Part IV.C. 
174. See, e.g., Gard v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 859 F.Supp. 1349, 1351-52 
(D.Colo. 1994). 
175.	 Id. at 1349-52. 
176.	 City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 174 (1997). 
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112 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
federal question177 and supplemental jurisdiction178 over the plain­
tiffs’ claims, which the Seventh Circuit had reversed.  In Part III, 
the Court made clear that the trial court had not yet ruled on a 
motion to dismiss the supplemental claims based upon § 1367(c), 
and that it would not address that issue in the first instance.179  The 
Court nevertheless went on to describe in broad terms the notion of 
discretionary authority to dismiss supplemental claims, quoting 
from Gibbs180 and another pre-1990 decision, Carnegie-Mellon 
Univ. v. Cohill.181  The Court did not discuss the text, legislative 
history, or lower court decisions interpreting § 1367(c).  But while 
this short, unsupported discussion182 is consistent with the view that 
the statute made no change in prior case law,183 it lends no more 
than superficial support to such a view. 
The courts of appeal have had more to say about the operation 
of § 1367(c), but none has addressed the specific question whether 
the risk of jury confusion has survived the 1990 codification.  Most 
of these appellate decisions concern the application of subsections 
(c)(1), (c)(2) and (c)(3), each of which has an antecedent in pre­
1990 case law184 and identifies a specific type of case that would be 
appropriate for discretionary dismissal.  A few courts of appeal 
have addressed subsection (c)(4).185  For example, in Executive 
Software North America, Inc. v. United States District Court,186 the 
district court remanded the supplemental (state law discrimination) 
claims while retaining jurisdiction of the properly removed federal 
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). 
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). 
179. City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 172-74. 
180. Id. at 172 (“[P]endent jurisdiction ‘is a doctrine of discretion, not of plain­
tiff’s right . . . .’”) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 
(1966)). 
181. Id. at 172-73 (“[W]e have indicated that ‘district courts [should] deal with 
cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of econ­
omy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doc­
trine.’”) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)). 
182. Part III is four paragraphs long and covers two full pages. City of Chicago, 
522 U.S. at 172-74. 
183. Professor Oakley had this to say about Carnegie-Mellon: “Because the case 
in question was being remanded to the Seventh Circuit, the Court’s framing of the is­
sues left open on remand in terms of the governing law of the relevant circuit does not 
support the inference that the Supreme Court has sub silentio resolved an unacknowl­
edged circuit split.”  John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Fed­
eral Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 943 n.381 (1998). 
184. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
185. Exec. Software N. Am. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Cal., 24 
F.3d 1545, 1557-61 (9th Cir. 1994). 
186. Id. at 1548. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 113 
discrimination claims.  The trial judge gave no reason, but did indi­
cate his view that § 1367(c) had simply codified prior case law.187 
Though not reported, the Ninth Circuit quoted from the trial 
judge’s opinion as follows: 
Even if [the Gibbs test is] met, however, a federal court has dis­
cretion to decline jurisdiction over state law claims if, for in­
stance, the state claims substantially predominate, the state 
claims involve novel or complex issues of state law, trial of the 
state and federal claims together is likely to result in jury confu­
sion, or retention of the state claims requires the expenditure of 
substantial additional judicial time and effort.  [Gibbs, 383 U.S.] 
at 726-27 . . . ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Carnegie-Mellon 
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 . . . (1988). 
The Removing Party(ies) should also be aware that this 
Court does not interpret the 1990 enactment of Section 1367 as 
restricting the discretionary factors set forth in Gibbs.  Rather, 
this Court interprets Section 1367 as merely allowing this Court, 
at its discretion, to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental par­
ties, which was previously foreclosed by Finley v. United States, 
490 U.S. 545 . . . (1989).188 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that failure to give any rea­
son for failing to accept supplemental jurisdiction was an abuse of 
discretion.189  After noting that a discretionary dismissal of a sup­
plemental claim could only be accomplished under § 1367(c) and 
that subsections (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) did not appear to apply, 
the court articulated its view that subsection (c)(4) narrowed the 
scope of a trial court’s discretion: 
[S]ubsection (c)(4), which also permits a court to decline jurisdic­
tion when, “in exceptional circumstances, there are other com­
pelling reasons,” channels the district court’s discretion to 
identify new grounds for declining jurisdiction more particularly 
than did preexisting doctrine.  Accordingly, we conclude the dis­
trict court erred to the extent that it relied on a basis for remand­
ing pendent claims not permitted under section 1367(c). Finally, 
we conclude that, because the district court failed to articulate 
187. Id. at 1551. 
188. Id. at 1548-49. 
189. Id. at 1562.  To the same effect as Executive Software is McLaurin v. Prater, 
30 F.3d 982, 985-86 (8th Cir. 1994) (remanded due to failure to give a reason for dis­
missing supplemental claim; on the merits court ruled for plaintiff on the § 1983 claim). 
The same result would have been reached prior to 1990. See, e.g., Miller v. Lovett , 879 
F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (giving no reason for refusing to exercise supplemen­
tal jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion). 
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114 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
reasons for its remand of the pendent claims, we cannot deter­
mine whether the district court relied on a statutory ground and 
exercised its discretion in a permissible manner.  Consequently, 
we conclude that the district court clearly erred.190 
But the Ninth Circuit never addressed the question whether 
the risk of jury confusion could be a “new ground” under (c)(4).  In 
footnote 14, the court cites to two district court decisions and sug­
gests a divide on this question,191 concluding: “[w]e intimate no 
view on the matter.”192  Several other courts of appeal have agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit that the statute has narrowed the scope of 
the trial judge’s discretion to dismiss supplemental claims, but none 
have addressed the availability of jury confusion as a permissible 
ground.193 
Other courts of appeal have parted company with the Ninth 
Circuit and reached the same conclusion as the trial judge in Execu­
tive Software, that § 1367(c) does not “restrict[ ] the discretionary 
factors set forth in Gibbs.”194  This language would seem to support 
the idea that risk of jury confusion is an appropriate ground on 
which to base a § 1367(c) dismissal.  However, none of these appel­
late decisions involves such a fact pattern. The discussion of discre­
tion has been in the context of § 1367(c)(1), (2), or (3).195  But while 
this split of the circuits has been one focus of the § 1367(c) scholar­
ship,196 we will see in the next part that none of it addresses the 
status of risk of jury confusion. 
190. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1551-51 (emphasis added). 
191. LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413, 1415 (D. 
Colo. 1993) (finding jury confusion is not within the statute); Picard v. Bay Area Reg’l 
Transit Dist., 823 F.Supp. 1519 (N.D.Cal. 1993) (suggesting that jury confusion is a per­
missible ground but finding no risk of confusion in this case). 
192. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1560. 
193. See Rachel Ellen Hinkle, The Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Debate 
Over the District Court’s Discretion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, 69 TENN. L. 
REV. 111, 120, 130-34 (2001) (listing the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits as 
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit); see also Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: 
The Problem of Federal Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 125-27 (2006) 
(listing the Second, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits as reading § 1367(c) as cur­
tailing the Gibbs approach to discretion). 
194. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1548; see Hinkle, supra note 193 at 121-30 (listing 
the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits as reading § 1367(c) as preserv­
ing the Gibbs approach to discretion). 
195. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1548. 
196. See 13B CHARLES  ALAN  WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3567.3 at 39 (2d ed. Supp 1992). 
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C. Post-1990 Scholarship 
A burst of scholarship followed almost immediately upon the 
passage of § 1367.197  Its primary focus was the obvious drafting er­
ror in § 1367(b), the subsection intended to limit supplemental ju­
risdiction in certain diversity-only lawsuits.198  Little attention was 
paid to § 1367(c), but to the extent it was discussed, the earliest 
articles tended to support the view that § 1367(c) was simply a codi­
fication of Gibbs.199 
Thus in 1991, Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler de­
scribe subsection (c) as follows: “It codifies those factors that the 
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs recognized as pro­
viding a sound basis for a lower court’s discretionary decision to 
decline supplemental jurisdiction.”200  Later in 1991, Professor 
Freer expressed the same view in a short paragraph describing 
§ 1367(c): “Thus, the statute basically codifies the teaching of Gibbs 
regarding the discretionary decline of supplemental jurisdiction.”201 
In 1992, Professor Steinman was heard from.202  She begins her dis­
cussion of § 1367(c)(4) in tune with the (c) codified Gibbs view,203 
but does acknowledge that the text might support a restriction in 
the permissible scope of discretion: “It is not apparent to me that 
[the risk of jury confusion] would constitute a compelling reason” 
under § 1367(c)(4).204  Eschewing further analysis of Congressional 
intent, she adds, “It is a more difficult question whether such a cur­
tailment of the courts’ discretion is or would be a good thing.”205 
And there the discussion of (c)(4) ends, “[b]ecause of my desire to 
discuss other matters and because I think that few judicial decisions 
197. See supra note 55. 
198. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (resolving 
the drafting problem). 
199. See supra notes 53-57, 125-29, and 158-69 and accompanying text. 
200. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M. Mengler, Congress 
Accepts Supreme Court’s Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICA­
TURE 213, 216 (1991) (citing only to Gibbs). 
201. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life 
After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 472 (1991) 
(citing only to § 1367(c) and to Gibbs). 
202. Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party Heard From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85 
(1992). 
203. Id. at 85-96 (relying primarily on the FCSC report and the first sentence of 
the relevant paragraph from the House Report). 
204. Id. at 94. 
205. Id. 
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116 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
are likely to be altered by § 1367(c)(4)’s language, I will not delve 
any further into this matter here.”206 
Some of the scholarship lends some support to the view that 
§ 1367(c) does narrow the scope of discretion.207  Professor 
Oakley’s 1991 discussion of § 1367(c) starts with the following sup­
port for the narrow view: 
By the juxtaposition of sections 1367(a) and 1367(c) Congress ap­
pears to have created a strong presumption in favor of the exer­
cise of supplemental jurisdiction.  Section 1367(a) grants the 
jurisdiction in mandatory terms (“shall have supplemental juris­
diction”) subject to section 1367(c)’s rather strict standards for 
when the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction.208 
But in the next sentence, he suggests an important role for Gibbs: 
“These standards combine the language of discretion found in 
Gibbs with the language of abstention.”209  Seven years later, Pro­
fessor Oakley was no closer to a resolution of this issue: “There are 
manifest discrepancies between Gibbs’ standards and the text of 
subsection 1367(c); the circuits are split as to whether these discrep­
ancies should be overlooked.”210  Clearer support for the view that 
the pre-1990 discretion was narrowed by the statute comes from 
Professor Wolf: 
Congress altered the approach of Gibbs that “pendent jurisdic­
tion is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”  If a liti­
gant satisfies the criteria for jurisdiction under subsection (a), 
then the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over 
all other claims . . . .” Thus, Congress converted a doctrine of 
judicial discretion to a claim of right, even though it retained 
some discretion, in § 1367(c), for the courts to dismiss supple­
mental claims.211 
As to the scope of that discretion, Professor Wolf suggested that 
compared to Gibbs, “the statute might be viewed as narrowing such 
discretion since it allows such exercises in only four limited circum­
206. Id. 
207. John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction 
and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
735 (1991). 
208. Id. at 766. 
209. Id. 
210. Oakley, supra note 183, at 943. 
211. Arthur D. Wolf, Comment on the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: 28 
U.S.C. § 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 223, 226 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 117 
stances.”212  In an earlier article, Professor Wolf pointed out how 
the changes made in the text of § 1367(c)(4) left no doubt that Con­
gress intended to narrow the scope of judicial discretion.213 
The two major procedure treatises have reported the divisions 
in the interpretation of § 1367(c)(4).214  As noted in Part IV.A,215 
two of the early district court opinions, one going each way, each 
relied upon the Wright, Miller and Cooper Treatise. In Padilla v. 
City of Saginaw,216 a 1994 wrongful death civil rights case where the 
removed federal claims were retained but the supplemental state 
court claims were remanded to state court, the opinion included the 
following quote from the Treatise: 
Wright, Miller & Cooper identify jury confusion as a sound rea­
son for a district court to remand state law claims over which it 
has supplemental jurisdiction.  “One example of this [exceptional 
circumstance under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4)] might be the possibil­
ity of jury confusion, which was recognized in Gibbs as a reason 
for declining jurisdiction.”  Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal 
Practice & Procedure, § 3567.1, n. 46.217 
A year earlier in an employment discrimination case, LaSorella 
v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare System,218 the court held that the 
risk of jury confusion was not an appropriate ground under 
§ 1367(c), and also relied on the same treatise: “As Wright and 
Miller put it, ‘The circumstances in which a court may exercise dis­
cretion to refuse to hear a case are quite strictly defined.’  13B C. 
Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3567.3 at 39 (2d ed. Supp.1992).”219 
Nearly twenty years later, neither of the above references has 
survived intact.  The current version of the treatise has this to say 
about jury confusion: “Perhaps [§ 1367(c)(4)’s] concern with ‘ex­
ceptional circumstances’ includes the Gibbs concern with things 
such as the likelihood of jury confusion, but the statute does not say 
212. Id. at 227. 
213. Wolf, supra note 14, at 24-25; see supra notes 78-126 (providing the details of 
the drafting of § 1367). 
214. See 16 JAMES  WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S  FEDERAL  PRACTICE–CIVIL 
§ 106.60[1] (2012). 
215. See supra note 144 and Part IV.A. 
216. Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F.Supp. 1309 (E.D.Mich. 1994). 
217. Id. at 1315 (brackets by the court; the treatise relies on Gibbs). 
218. LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413 (D. Colo. 
1993). 
219. Id. at 1416. 
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118 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
so.”220  This quote is followed by reports of cases going both 
ways.221 
As to the status of jury confusion as a ground for discretionary 
dismissal, Moore’s treatise on Federal Practice is less precise, but 
equally equivocal.222  Moore first cites circuits expressing the “View 
That [the] Statute Codifies [the] Gibbs Factors,”223 and in the next 
section cites circuits with the “View That [the] Statute Alters Com­
mon Law Analysis”224—circuits rejecting the simplistic “nothing 
was changed by the statute” approach.225  This latter section no­
where mentions jury confusion, and as noted earlier, neither do any 
of the circuit cases in this group.226  The treatise makes no effort to 
analyze or reconcile these seemingly conflicting lines of cases.227 
V. ANALYSIS: JURY CONFUSION IS  NOT WITHIN § 1367(C)(4) 
Part II of this Article makes it clear that for the nearly twenty 
five years between Gibbs and the adoption of § 1367, there was no 
controversy concerning  the discretionary power of federal trial 
judges to dismiss what are now called supplemental claims, or the 
grounds on which the judge could base such a decision.228  The like­
lihood of jury confusion if the supplemental and federal claims were 
tried together was “on the list” of appropriate grounds.  Most deci­
sions, whether to retain or dismiss, were upheld when challenged on 
appeal.229 
220. 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.3, 400 (2010). 
221. Id. at 402, n. 33. 
222. See generally 16 JAMES  WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S  FEDERAL  PRAC­
TICE–CIVIL § 106.60[2] (2012). 
223. Id.  In addition to case citations, the only other source in this section is the 
House Report. Id. 
224. Id. § 106.60[3]. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. § 106.60. 
228. See discussion supra Part II. 
229. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing problems with ap­
peal).  In the rare cases where a dismissal was reversed, it was on the ground that the 
trial judge had abused her discretion, usually failing to give any reason for the dismissal; 
see, e.g., Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1073 (2d Cir. 1989) (giving no reason for refus­
ing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion).  Until 2009, remand 
to state court of supplemental claims that were part of a properly removed case, as 
opposed to dismissal, was thought to be not appealable by reason of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(d); however, in Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009), the 
Court unanimously held that such remand orders are not based upon lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and thus may be reviewed by direct appeal. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 119 
Part III of this Article makes it clear that when Congress codi­
fied the grounds for discretionary dismissal of supplemental claims, 
the likelihood of jury confusion was not expressly included.230  Also 
clear from the history of the legislation was the final change in the 
language of the catch-all provision231 from language that would eas­
ily provide a source for “jury confusion” to language that is inhospi­
table to such a ground. 
Part IV of this Article makes it equally clear that since the 
adoption of § 1367, both courts and scholars have divided on the 
scope of § 1367(c)(4): some viewing the statute as having codified 
the pre-1990 case law and others viewing the statute as having sig­
nificantly limited the scope of discretion under prior case law.232 
Some district courts have focused specifically on the availability of 
the risk of jury confusion as an appropriate ground for pretrial dis­
missal, and have divided.233  This specific issue has not yet been ad­
dressed by the appellate courts or the scholars.234 
As noted earlier, § 1367(c) provides the exclusive basis for the 
discretionary dismissal of a supplemental claim, and there is no 
room in subsections (c)(1), (c)(2), or (c)(3) for jury confusion.235 
As such, if jury confusion remains “on the list,” it must be under 
(c)(4). 
A. Textual Analysis 
The interpretation of § 1376(c)(4) as it applies to supplemental 
claims that pose a potential for jury confusion “is simple and 
straightforward.”236  It proceeds on the assumption that clear, un­
ambiguous text must be applied, especially when that text is consis­
tent not only with other relevant parts of the text of the statute but 
also the broad, unambiguous policies of the statute.237 
Section 1367(c)(4) limits discretionary dismissal to supplemen­
tal claims that present both (i) circumstances and (ii) compelling 
230. See discussion supra Part III. 
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 
232. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
233. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1-2. 
234. In Executive Software v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 
1545 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit identified the issue and explicitly left it un­
resolved. See supra text at note 192. 
235. The closest the statute comes is § 1367(c)(1), which concerns judge confu­
sion, not jury confusion. 
236. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977). 
237. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Comm’n v. Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n, 589 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala. 
1991). 
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120 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
reasons for declining jurisdiction.238  It may be that a persuasive ar­
gument could be made in a particular case that the risk of jury con­
fusion presents a “compelling reason for declining jurisdiction.”239 
The same cannot be said for the independent requirement that the 
circumstance be “exceptional.” 
As far back as 1976, then Justice Rehnquist undermined the 
argument that the likelihood of jury confusion could ever be excep­
tional.  In Aldinger v. Howard,240 he was reiterating the point made 
by the Ninth Circuit—and flatly rejected by Congress in 1990 when 
it adopted § 1367(a)241—that adding a pendent party was a bad 
idea.  Among the reasons he gave in support was the following, 
drawn from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion: “[P]endent state-law claims 
arising in a civil rights context will ‘almost inevitably’ involve the 
federal court in difficult and unsettled questions of state law, with 
the accompanying potential for jury confusion.  513 F.2d at 1261­
1262.”242 
The continued frequency with which the lower federal courts 
continue to rely on jury confusion suggests that not much has 
changed in the thirty-five years since Aldinger.  The potential for 
jury confusion is not exceptional.  Yet for the past twenty years, 
despite the adoption of § 1367, some federal trial judges continue to 
rely on the risk of jury confusion as a ground to dismiss supplemen­
tal claims. 
Most cases that have used (c)(4) to dismiss supplemental 
claims solely on the ground that there is a risk of jury confusion 
have ignored the “exceptional circumstances” requirement.243  A 
few courts have attempted to address the point, but with hollow 
reasoning.244  Thus, in Walker v. City of Detroit,245 a false arrest, 
false imprisonment civil rights claim, the trial court dismissed the 
supplemental state law claims under (c)(4) sua sponte due to the 
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 
239. Id. Many cases develop this point. See, e.g., Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 
F.Supp. 1309, 1315-16 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
240. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
241. Specifically, the last sentence of § 1367(a). 
242. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 6.  Of course, Justice Rehnquist cited no authority for 
the fairly remarkable assertion that state law will continue to pose “difficult and unset­
tled questions” for federal courts. Id. 
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 
244. Walker v. City of Detroit, No. 10-13179, 2010 WL 4259835, at *6 
(E.D.Mich.2010) (Cleland, J.). 
245. Id. at *2-4. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 121 
risk of jury confusion.  After explaining in some detail246 why the 
risk of confusion was a compelling reason to dismiss, the opinion 
deals with the “exceptional circumstances” requirement in a single 
paragraph: 
The court finds that exceptional circumstances are present in this 
case in weighing the likelihood of jury confusion, judicial ineffi­
ciency, substantial inconvenience to the parties, and potential un­
fairness in outcome which could readily result by attempting to 
resolve all claims in a single trial. Though there would be some 
duplication of effort required by Plaintiff and the defense in this 
case if Plaintiff decides to pursue all of the claims, the court finds 
that any advantages to be gained by trying all claims together are 
outweighed by the potential for confusion of the issues, legal the­
ories, and defenses.  Thus, the court will not exercise supplemen­
tal jurisdiction and will dismiss without prejudice all state law 
claims.247 
Clearly, there is nothing in this paragraph that in any way could be 
viewed as describing any exceptional circumstance.  Rather, it reit­
erates the basic reasons for dismissal on this ground that have been 
in use since Gibbs. 
A conclusion that the risk of jury confusion is not a permissible 
basis for a (c)(4) dismissal does not render (c)(4) superfluous. 
There have been, and will continue to be, cases that are properly 
subject to (c)(4) dismissal. For example, in Voda v. Cortis Corp.,248 
a patent infringement action included supplemental claims based on 
foreign patent law.  The Federal Circuit held that “a district court’s 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction could undermine the obliga­
tions of the United States under [international patent] treaties, 
which therefore constitute an exceptional circumstance to decline 
jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4).”249  And in Sparrow v. Mazda 
American Credit,250 a claim that a debt collector engaged in abusive 
practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA), the court used § 1367(c)(4) to dismiss the supplemental 
counterclaims, which sought to recover the underlying debt.  Ex­
ceptional circumstances were based on protecting the policy of the 
FDCPA: 
246. The opinion provided such explanation in eleven paragraphs. See id. at *3-7. 
247. Walker, 2010 WL 4259835 at *6. 
248. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 894 (Fed.Cir. 2007). 
249. Id. at 900. 
250. Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1069-71 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
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122 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
[A]llowing a debt collector to bring an action for the underlying 
debt in a case brought under the FDCPA may deter litigants 
from pursuing their rights under that statute . . . . This policy 
satisfies the exceptional circumstances requirement to support an 
order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defen­
dant’s state law claims to enforce the debt.251 
And in Hays County Guardian v. Supple, the district court re­
manded, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the plaintiff’s claims 
against state officials in their official capacities.252  With those 
claims remanded, the district court decided not to exercise supple­
mental jurisdiction over the claims against the defendants in their 
individual capacities, for which there was no Eleventh Amendment 
bar.253  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding “exceptional circum­
stances” and “compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction” over 
state-law claims while identical claims, differing only in the capacity 
in which the defendants were sued, were proceeding in state 
court.254  Such duplicative litigation “would be a pointless waste of 
judicial resources.”255 
B. Congressional Intent 
While the clarity of the textual argument might support the 
view that there is no need to go any further, the seemingly ambigu­
ous phrases of (c)(4) suggest that an analysis of congressional intent 
is appropriate.  The source for the argument that congressional in­
tent supports the inclusion of jury confusion on “the list” is the first 
sentence from the one relevant paragraph in the House Report.256 
“Subsection [1367](c) codifies the factors that the Supreme Court 
has recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a district 
court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim, even 
though it is empowered to hear the claim.”257 
Before examining this sentence (and the rest of the House Re­
port), it will be useful to recall the process that led to the adopted 
251. Id. at 1071. 
252. Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 124 (5th Cir. 1992). 
253. Id. at 125. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-734 (to accompany H.R. 5381), 6875 (1990); see also supra note 126 and accom­
panying text (containing the entire paragraph from the House Report). 
257. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-734 (to accompany H.R. 5381), 6875 (1990). 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 123 
text.258  In the case of (c)(4), the catch-all provision, we have an 
informative trail to follow, starting with the text. The first version 
of subsection (c) had no catch-all provision.259  The next, the Weis-
FCSC version, had a catch-all with the broadest possible reach, per­
mitting discretionary dismissal for any “other appropriate reason[ ] 
. . . for declining jurisdiction.”260  The final adopted language elimi­
nates the broad language and replaces it with two high hurdles: the 
reason for dismissal must be both “exceptional” and 
“compelling.”261 
The next place to look for Congressional intent, after the text 
in question, would be the other parts of the same statute–i.e. the 
rest of § 1367.  Again, the useful information points in the same 
direction.  In § 1367(a), Congress significantly expanded the scope 
of jurisdictional power over supplemental claims.  Both the text of 
(a) and the relevant portions of the House Report make this 
point.262  It would be unusual if Congress intended that the 
§ 1367(a) welcome sign could be undermined by the simple expedi­
ent of a judge, acting pursuant to essentially unreviewable discre­
tion, stating there would be a risk of jury confusion if the 
supplemental claim were not dismissed.  The final revision of the 
text of (c)(4) is strong evidence that Congress intended to protect 
subsection (a) by significantly narrowing the scope of the (c)(4) 
catch-all. 
No post-1990 opinion that supports a (c)(4) dismissal based on 
jury confusion has much to say about the text or congressional in­
tent.  Rather, as noted above, some rely on a sentence from the one 
relevant paragraph of the House Report. The serious flaw in this 
paragraph was discussed earlier.263 
Why did the House Report contain such an error?  One possi­
ble explanation suggests itself upon a careful examination of the 
legislative path of (c)(4).  While the House itself has been criticized 
for rushing the passage of this statute,264 the same cannot be said 
258. See supra notes 94-121 and accompanying text. 
259. Hearings, supra note 40, at 28-32 (describing the Wolf-Egnal Proposal). 
260. Id. at 98; see also id. at 89-98 (the full proposal submitted by Judge Weis). 
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006). 
262. See, e.g., Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-743 (to accompany H.R. 5381) (1990).  “In federal question cases, 
[the statute] broadly authorizes the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over additional claims, including claims involving the joinder of additional parties.” Id. 
at 6874. 
263. See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra note 172. 
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124 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
for the drafting process.  The bill, which became § 1367, was first 
introduced in Congress on July 26, 1990.265  Hearings were held on 
September 6, 1990.266  Prior to the Hearings, major changes were 
made from the original draft at the suggestion of Judge Weis and 
others.267  The Weis draft included as (c)(4) a broadly worded 
catch-all provision, which authorized discretionary dismissal for 
“other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, 
and fairness to the litigants . . . .”268  Clearly, such language could be 
fairly said to support the view that prior case law was to be codified. 
However, after the Hearing, (c)(4) was substantially rewritten.  In­
stead of an unlimited list of reasons that only had to satisfy the test 
of being “appropriate,” (c)(4) now requires that the reason for dis­
missal be both “exceptional” and “compelling.”269  The House Re­
port was filed on September 18, 1990, and clearly reflects the 
adopted version of (c)(4).270 
The first sentence of the paragraph would have made sense if it 
had been drafted with the Weis version of (c) in mind. But in light 
of the final version of (c)(4), which was clearly in mind when the 
second and third sentences of the paragraph were drafted, it is hard 
to understand how the first sentence was drafted at the same time. 
It could well be that the second and third sentences were inserted 
without realizing how they clashed with the first sentence.271 
In any event, the text of (c)(4) and the broad policies reflected 
by § 1367(a) leave no doubt that the text means what it says and 
that jury confusion is not “on the list.”  So how is it that so many 
judges got it wrong?  Not surprisingly, many judges would like to 
maximize the scope of their discretionary power.  Moreover, if a 
judge wants to dismiss a supplemental claim, supporting the asser­
tion that there is a risk of jury confusion will be fairly simple. 
265. See generally Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-743 (to accompany H.R. 5381) (1990). 
266. Id. 
267. See Wolf, supra note 14, at 15-20. 
268. Hearings, supra note 40, and accompanying text (describing the full proposal 
submitted by Judge Weis, Hearings, supra note 40, at 98, following his prepared state­
ment to the committee). 
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006). 
270. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implemenation Act of 1990, H.R. REP 
NO. 101-734 (to accompany H.R. 5381) (1990). 
271. The simple fix is to read the word “some” into the first sentence, so it would 
accurately reflect that Congress codified some, but not all, prior case law. 
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2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 125 
CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that the elimination of the risk of jury 
confusion as a ground for dismissal of supplemental claims is sup­
ported by the text, the broad policies of the supplemental jurisdic­
tion statute, and the very specific path that led to the text of 
§ 1367(c).  Moreover, this conclusion finds further support in the 
broad procedural policies. 
If we focus on the impact of discretionary dismissals of supple­
mental claims, the most important point is the ground for the dis­
missal.  If it occurred following a dismissal (on the merits) of the 
federal claims or due to the substantial predominance of the pen­
dent claim, it could be fairly said that the lawsuit belonged in state 
court.272  Following dismissal of these cases, any further litigation 
would be in state court and there would be no harm to any signifi­
cant interest.  If the ground for dismissal was the novelty or com­
plexity of the state law issue, there would be significant competing 
interests.273  It would be difficult to defend either outcome categori­
cally.274  In situations where the sole ground for the dismissal of the 
supplemental claim was the risk or likelihood of jury confusion, 
there would be a clear frustration both of the plaintiffs’ interests in 
obtaining full vindication of their rights in a single proceeding as 
well as the broad procedural interest in overall efficiency. The sup­
posed upside of such a dismissal is to avoid a hypothetical federal 
institutional interest in avoiding a confused jury (if the case is ever 
tried).275 
The institutional interests that were served or disserved by 
such a dismissal depended on the choice made by the plaintiff.  If 
the plaintiff separately pursued both the state and federal claims, 
overall institutional interests in efficiency were disserved, even if 
the federal trial jury heard a simpler case.276  And if the dismissal 
272. These two grounds are codified as § 1367(c)(2) and (c)(3). 
273. Codified as § 1367(c)(1); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 
U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that overall efficiency would be served by retention of the 
claim, while dismissal would lead to “a surer-footed reading of applicable [state] law”). 
274. But I’ll try; a better result is to keep lawsuit together and use certification to 
the highest state court to resolve the state law issue. The Wolf-Egnal proposal con­
tained such a provision. See subsection (f), Hearings, supra note 40, at 31; see also 
Wolf, supra note 14, at 30-31. 
275. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing difficult choices 
facing a plaintiff).  On the likelihood of trial, a 2004 federal study found that 97 percent 
of civil cases are settled or dismissed without a trial. Supra note 43. 
276. See supra note 275 (discussing how rarely civil lawsuits are actually tried); 
see also supra note 48. 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 67 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 67 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE103.txt unknown Seq: 42  9-MAY-12 10:37
126 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:85 
led to the plaintiffs’ abandoning the state claims (and litigating only 
in federal court) or abandoning the federal claims (and litigating 
only in state court), the federal institutional advantage of avoiding a 
complicated jury trial (if the case was actually tried) could hardly 
overcome this loss to the plaintiff.  Certainly, such a result was con­
trary to the spirit of § 1367, of Gibbs, and of modern procedure 
generally.277 
A final reason for concluding that the likelihood of jury confu­
sion should be categorically eliminated as a ground for discretion­
ary dismissal is the ease with which a trial judge can invoke it to 
justify dismissal, whether or not that is the true reason, as well as 
the difficulty of appellate supervision of such dismissals.  Moreover, 
there are well known techniques for reducing or eliminating jury 
confusion (if the claims are tried together).278  And there is always 
the possibility of separate federal trials.  In its discussion of the risk 
of jury confusion as a possible ground for discretionary dismissal, 
the Gibbs Court noted that this factor was “independent of jurisdic­
tional considerations” and that in such a situation, “jurisdiction 
should ordinarily be refused.”279 
277. Recall that Gibbs upheld a trial judge’s holding that retained, rather than 
dismissed, a pendent claim, and commended the judge for “employing a special verdict 
form” so that “the possibility of confusion could be lessened.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729. 
And recall that at the start of Gibbs’ discussion of discretion is the point that pendent 
jurisdiction is justified by “considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness 
to litigants.” Id. at 726.  The court further discussed that dismissal would be appropri­
ate where these factors were not present. Id.  There is no suggestion in Gibbs that 
pendent claims should be dismissed because the trial judge has to work a little harder to 
make the case less confusing for the jury. See generally id. 
278. Id. at 726-27. 
279. Id. at 727 (emphasis added). 
